Too Many Limitations
The Crash of Regional One

By Jim Messer, Partner

In the 1973 movie “Magnum Force,” Clint Eastwood coined the phrase “a man’s got to know his limitations.” In aviation, not knowing one’s limitations can be the difference between life and death. Sadly, on July 13, 2004, a pilot and his employer forgot theirs.

The Helicopter Crash

It was 4:52 a.m. in upstate South Carolina when a radio dispatcher called for a helicopter air ambulance service. The call was answered by Regional One, a helicopter operated by the Med-Trans Corporation. The dispatcher explained a young woman had been injured at the I-26 rest stop. Dawn was still an hour and one half away.

The pilot took off from Spartanburg at 5:02 a.m. and landed at the rest stop at 5:23 a.m. Ten minutes after arriving, Regional One took off and climbed over the darkened pines of the Sumter National Forest. Less than 500 yards later the helicopter collided with trees and crashed to the forest floor. In the burning wreckage there were no survivors.

The Investigation

Familiar with our firm’s extensive aviation litigation experience, particularly helicopter air ambulances litigation, we were retained by the helicopter flight paramedic’s widow.

Firm Partner Jim Messer, a former Army helicopter pilot and Firm Investigator Bob Parke, a certified flight instructor, immediately flew to the crash site. Extensive investigation would eventually lead to the cause of the crash, but the first order of business was to conduct a ground inspection.

After the site had been cleared by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) the entire area was photographed, including the damage to the trees caused by the downward spiral of the helicopter. The same day, a helicopter air survey was conducted to memorialize the final path of the flight and crash. Finally, a survey firm was hired to complete a topographical survey of the flight from the pick-up point to the first tree strike. Witness interviews pointed to pilot error, but mechanical failure had to be ruled out.

Because of the complexity of rotary-wing incidents we hired a helicopter procedures expert, an airframe and power plant expert, an aviation accident reconstruction firm and a forensic meteorologist. The inspection of the helicopter wreckage, and the survey of the location of the major parts of the wreckage, pointed way from mechanical failure. The expert’s opinions confirmed the initial premise – pilot error caused the crash. Later the NTSB would also confirm our conclusion.

Suit was filed against Med-Trans. Aware that we represented the flight paramedic’s widow, the flight nurse’s widower contacted us requesting we represent him as well. His claim was added to the suit and the formal legal investigatory process, or discovery, began. The more we looked the more we found that the pilot error leading to the crash began years before the fatal flight from Spartanburg.

Pilot and Company Background

The Bell 407 is a strong but small helicopter able to carry one pilot, one patient and two support personnel. The helicopter is so small that when the patient is placed onboard, their feet extend into the cockpit next to the pilot. Air ambulances often fly at night and in poor weather. This means the ability to fly without outside reference, or instrument flight, is critical to safe operation. Discovery revealed the pilot, although instrument rated, had never flown in instrument conditions nor had he been trained in an instrument simulator. This lack of company training kept him from being a proficient instrument pilot.

Next we learned the company required its pilots to have 1500 hours of turbine engine operation time, that is, 1500 hours operating a sophisticated helicopter. Inexplicably, the crash pilot had only 500 hours of turbine time, a violation of the company’s own protocol. Worse, the pilot had limited flight time in the Bell 407 and so little night flight experience in the six months prior to the crash that he was just days way from being barred from night flight.

Despite these shortcomings, the pilot remained on duty. Lacking instrument expertise and night experience, flight into marginal weather conditions would eventually result in a catastrophe.

Shopping For A Flight

By the early morning hours of July 13, 2004, the weather was so bad the National Aviation Weather Forecast Service issued a special warning for fog, mist and rain. As a result, the Greenville Med-Trans operation went “condition red” and would not accept flight requests. Three other helicopter services were located in the area; Palmetto Health Richland in Columbia, South Carolina; Providence Life Reach, also in Columbia and Regional One in Spartanburg, South Carolina. By morning only three services remained.

At 4:40 a.m. the first alert went out to Palmetto Health Richland. Newberry County requested an air ambulance to pick up a patient at the I-26 rest-stop. Palmetto’s Careforce helicopter took off, but bad weather forced it back to the pad in four minutes.

In what is known as shopping, Newberry County contacted Providence Life Reach requesting a flight, but Life Reach monitored the progress of Careforce and refused. The shopping continued when dispatch called Med Trans One in Greenville, but it shut down at midnight.

The final call was to Regional One at 4:52 a.m. Despite three helicopters who had declined the flight because of dangerous weather, Regional One accepted the mission.

The Scene of the Pickup and the Crash

The forensic meteorologist’s post-crash radar and satellite analysis showed a flight through poor visibility, fog and misting rain – exactly what the weather service predicted. Witnesses saw fog in the tree tops as the helicopter approached. During landing the pilot used a high power searchlight which, according to the procedures expert, would significantly degrade night vision for up to thirty minutes. When the helicopter took off, it headed out over the pitch black of the Sumter National Forest. Witnesses confirmed the helicopter was headed toward Spartanburg, but the pilot never climbed more than just above the trees. Sadly, the ground survey confirmed the flight route took Regional One across rising terrain. When the hills rose to meet the level flight of the helicopter, it struck the trees and crashed. What appears to have been an attempt to fly under the weather came to a disastrous end with all occupants consumed in the post-crash fire.

Med-Trans Denies Responsibility

Since the helicopter pilot caused the crash, the average person would think that the case was over – not Med-Trans. The deceased flight nurse and flight paramedic had been employed by the Spartanburg hospital. They were never employed by the air ambulance company, never took orders from the company and never received a paycheck from the company. Nonetheless, in an attempt to escape responsibility, Med-Trans alleged that both of the deceased crew were “statutory” employees of their company. Because employees in South Carolina are prohibited from suing their own employer, the company was trying to limit the clients to workers compensation benefits. Claiming the case would take years to get through the appellate courts, the company tried to intimidate the clients. When Med-Trans discovered we were well-versed on the law, and had steadfast clients, a settlement conference was requested. Mediation in Greenville, South Carolina, led to a large, but confidential, settlement for both clients. Although each lost their spouse, they could now move on with their lives.

Aftermath

The NTSB eventually released their report showing he pilot’s failure to maintain terrain clearance caused the crash. The agency determined contributing factors were inadequate weather and dispatch information relayed to the pilot. In a later hearing, the NTSB noted there were 55 emergency medical aircraft crashes in the three-year period ending in January 2005 – 21 of which were fatal. The NTSB recommended changes in procedures and the installation of terrain awareness systems on aircraft, but it did not have the authority to require changes. The Federal Aviation Administration refused to require the changes, and instead asked the industry to voluntarily adopt recommendations. Med-Trans Corporation declined comment on the recommendations.

The crash, litigation and NTSB findings did result in the formation of the South Carolina Association of Air Medical Services, an alliance of 12 programs serving the Carolinas and Georgia. Now, when a helicopter service refuses a call because of weather, all other services are immediately notified. And that is important, because a man has got to know his limitations.